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To facilitate rapid detection of a future bioterrorist
attack, an increasing number of public health departments
are investing in new surveillance systems that target the
early manifestations of bioterrorism-related disease.
Whether this approach is likely to detect an epidemic soon-
er than reporting by alert clinicians remains unknown. The
detection of a bioterrorism-related epidemic will depend on
population characteristics, availability and use of health
services, the nature of an attack, epidemiologic features of
individual diseases, surveillance methods, and the capaci-
ty of health departments to respond to alerts. Predicting
how these factors will combine in a bioterrorism attack may
be impossible. Nevertheless, understanding their likely
effect on epidemic detection should help define the useful-
ness of syndromic surveillance and identify approaches to
increasing the likelihood that clinicians recognize and
report an epidemic. 
B
ecause of heightened concerns about the possibility of
bioterrorist attacks, public health agencies are testing
new methods of surveillance intended to detect the early
manifestations of illness that may occur during a bioterror-
ism-related epidemic. Broadly labeled “syndromic surveil-
lance,” these efforts encompass a spectrum of activities
that include monitoring illness syndromes or events, such
as medication purchases, that reflect the prodromes of
bioterrorism-related diseases (1–9). The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that, as
of May 2003, health departments in the United States have
initiated syndromic surveillance systems in approximately
100 sites throughout the country (T. Treadwell, CDC, pers.
comm.). The goal of these systems is to enable earlier
detection of epidemics and a more timely public health
response, hours or days before disease clusters are recog-
nized clinically, or before specific diagnoses are made and
reported to public health authorities. Whether this goal is
achievable remains unproved (4,5,10).
Establishing a diagnosis is critical to the public health
response to a bioterrorism-related epidemic, since the
diagnosis will guide the use of vaccinations, medications,
and other interventions. Absent a bioterrorism attack, pre-
dicting whether syndromic surveillance will trigger an
investigation that yields a diagnosis before clinicians make
and report a diagnosis is not possible. Our objective is to
consider the mix of hypothetical factors that may affect the
detection of epidemics attributable to CDC category A
bioterrorism agents (11). 
Establishing a Diagnosis
Two pathways to establishing a diagnosis are described
by the scenarios below and in Figure 1, using a single, clan-
destine dissemination of an anthrax aerosol as an example.
Detection through Syndromic Surveillance
The early signs of inhalational anthrax include nonspe-
cific symptoms that may persist for several days before the
onset of more severe disease (12). Patients with prodromal
illnesses seek outpatient care and are assigned nonspecific
diagnoses such as “viral syndrome.” Data on patients fit-
ting various syndromic criteria are transferred to the health
department and tested for aberrant trends. This process
“flags” that a statistical detection threshold has been
exceeded. Epidemiologists conclude that a preliminary
investigation is warranted and collect blood for culture
from several patients. Within 18 hours, one culture yields
a presumptive diagnosis of anthrax, prompting a full-scale
response. 
Detection through Clinician Reporting
Some persons in whom inhalational anthrax develops
will have short incubation periods and prodromes (12).
Respiratory distress occurs in one such person, and he is
hospitalized. Routine admission procedures include blood
cultures. Within 18 hours, a presumptive diagnosis of
anthrax is made. The patient’s physician informs the local
health department, prompting a full-scale response.
In practice, how a bioterrorism attack might be detect-
ed and diagnosed will probably be more complex.
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that epidemic was too small and geographically diffuse to
be detectable by syndromic surveillance. For six patients
with known dates of exposure, the median duration
between exposure and symptom onset was 4 days (range
4–6 days).The median duration between onset and the ini-
tial healthcare visit was 3 days (20) (range 1–7 days), and
the median duration between onset of symptoms and hos-
pitalization was 4 days (range 3–7 days). Two of the 11
patients visited emergency departments and were sent
home with diagnoses of gastroenteritis or viral syndrome 1
day before admission. In one patient, a blood culture
obtained in the emergency room was read as positive for
gram-positive bacilli the following day, which prompted
recall of the patient. The culture was subsequently con-
firmed as positive for Bacillus anthracis. Two other
patients were seen by primary care physicians and sent
home with diagnoses of viral syndrome or bronchitis 2–3
days before admission, including one patient who was
begun on empiric antibiotic therapy. For seven other
patients, initial emergency room or hospital visits led
directly to admission. In addition to the patient whose
blood culture was obtained in an emergency room, seven
others had not received prior antibiotic therapy, and B.
anthracis was presumptively identified from blood within
24 hours of culture. One of these seven patients was the
index patient, in whom B. anthracis was also recognized in
cerebrospinal fluid within 7 hours of specimen collection.
Three other patients had received antibiotics before blood
cultures were taken (one as an outpatient and two at the
time of hospital admission), requiring alternative diagnos-
tic methods. 
Despite the small number of patients, their experience
offers four lessons for detecting an epidemic of inhalation-
al anthrax. First, a key objective of syndromic surveillance
is to detect early-stage disease, but fewer than half of these
patients sought care before hospitalization was necessary,
and the interval between such care and admission was rel-
atively narrow (1–3 days). This finding suggests that syn-
dromic surveillance data must be processed, analyzed, and
acted upon quickly if such data are to provide a clue to
diagnosis in advance of late-stage disease. Second, emer-
gency room data are a common source for syndromic sur-
veillance, but detecting an increase in visits coincident
with hospital admission may not provide an early warning
because the time needed to process surveillance data and
investigate suspected cases would be at least as long as the
time for admission blood cultures to be positive for B.
anthracis.  Blood cultures are likely to be routine for
patients admitted with fever and severe respiratory illness,
regardless of whether anthrax is considered as a diagnostic
possibility, and B. anthracis grows readily in culture in the
absence of prior antibiotic therapy, as observed in most of
these patients. Thus, if emergency room data are to be use-
ful in early detection of an anthrax epidemic, those data
would need to be for visits that occur before hospital care
is required—a pattern observed in only two patients. Third,
the four patients who received early care and were dis-
charged to their homes were assigned three different diag-
noses, which suggests that syndromic surveillance systems
must address the potential variability in how patients with
the same infection may be diagnosed during the prodrome
phase. Fourth, rapid diagnosis after hospitalization was
possible only in those patients who had not received antibi-
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1For interval calculations, if reported event dates were discrepant
in different case reports, dates reported by Jernigan et al. (13)
were used.
Figure 1. Number of cases of syndromic illness by time in a hypo-
thetical bioterrorism attack and two pathways to establishing a
diagnosis: syndromic surveillance coupled with public health
investigation (upper pathway) and clinical and diagnostic evalua-
tion of patients with short-incubation period disease (lower path-
way). A, scenario favoring earlier detection by means of clinical
evaluation. B, scenario favoring earlier detection by means of syn-
dromic surveillance.
A
Botics before cultures were taken. This finding emphasizes
the importance of judicious use of antibiotics in patients
with nonspecific illness. 
In addition to the specific attributes of individual
bioterrorism agents, multiple considerations will shape the
recognition of a bioterrorism-related epidemic. Five of
these attributes follow. 
Size
Syndromic surveillance would not detect outbreaks too
small to trigger statistical alarms. Size would be affected
by the virulence of the agent, its potential for person-to-
person transmission, the extent and mode of agent dissem-
ination, whether dissemination occurs in more than one
time or place, and population vulnerability. 
Population Dispersion
How persons change locations after an exposure will
affect whether disease occurs in a concentrated or wide
area, and thus whether clustering is apparent to clinicians or
detectable through syndromic surveillance at specific sites. 
Health Care
The more knowledgeable providers are about bioterror-
ism agents, the greater the likelihood of recognition.
Routine diagnostic practices or access to reference labora-
tories may affect the timeliness of diagnosis for some dis-
eases. Familiarity with reporting procedures would
increase prompt reporting of suspected or diagnosed cases. 
Syndromic Surveillance
Syndromic surveillance will be affected by the selec-
tion of data sources, timeliness of information manage-
ment, definition of syndrome categories, selection of sta-
tistical detection thresholds, availability of resources for
followup, recent experience with false alarms, and criteria
for initiating investigations.
Season
A fifth key attribute is seasonality. An increase in ill-
ness associated with a bioterrorism attack may be more
difficult to detect if it occurs during a seasonal upswing in
naturally occurring disease. 
Agent- and disease-specific attributes may be among
the most important factors affecting detection and diagno-
sis (Table 2). The incubation period and its distribution in
the population will affect the rate at which new cases
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Table 1. Outcome of initial contact with health care for anthrax-
related illness and timing of anthrax diagnosis, 11 patients with 
inhalational anthrax, 2001
a 
Outcome  No. of patients 
Disposition after initial medical care   
Admitted to hospital  7 
Discharged home from ER, subsequent hospital 
admission  
2 
Discharged home from outpatient provider, 
subsequent hospital admission 
2 
Total   11 
Anthrax diagnosis   
Blood or CSF culture on hospital admission, 
presumptive diagnosis <24 h 
7 
Blood culture from preceding ER visit, patient 
recalled for admission 
1 
Prior antibiotic therapy; clinical suspicion of 
anthrax; specialized test required to establish 
diagnosis 
3 
Total  11 
aER, emergency room; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid. 
A
B
Figure 2. Timeline to presumptive anthrax diagnosis, 11 patients
with inhalational anthrax, 2001, United States. Abbreviations: Dx,
diagnosis; OutPt, outpatient visit followed by discharge home; ER,
emergency room visit followed by discharge home. *Diagnosis
delayed-initial blood cultures were negative in three patients who
received antibiotic therapy before culture specimens were collect-
ed, requiring use of special diagnostic tests. For patients 1-10,
case numbers correspond to those in report by Jernigan et al. (13);
patient 11 reported by Barakat et al. (14). A, timeline begins with
presumed date of anthrax exposure, available for six patients. B,
timeline begins with day of illness onset for five patients without
recognized date of exposure























Days after anthrax expossuredevelop (21) and thus how quickly an alarm threshold is
exceeded or whether clinicians recognize a temporal and
geographic cluster. If a disease has a short prodrome, the
chance is increased that a patient would be hospitalized
and a definitive evaluation initiated before an increase in
cases triggered a surveillance alarm. Alternatively, if a dis-
ease has a relatively long prodrome, chances are greater
that prediagnostic events (e.g., purchase of medications or
use of outpatient care for nonspecific complaints) would
accrue to levels that exceed syndromic surveillance thresh-
olds, before definitive diagnostic evaluations are complet-
ed among patients with more severe disease. Arousing
clinical suspicion for a particular diagnosis will depend on
the specificity of both the early and late stages of illness as
well as the presence or absence of a typical feature that
should alert clinicians to the diagnosis, such as mediastinal
widening in inhalational anthrax (12). If a routinely per-
formed test is apt to be diagnostic in a short time (e.g., the
blood culture in anthrax), a rapid diagnosis is likely, even
in the absence of clinical suspicion. If routine tests are
unlikely to yield a rapid diagnosis (e.g., the blood culture
for the cause of tularemia, Francisella tularensis [22]), or
if the diagnosis requires a special test (e.g., the hemorrhag-
ic fever viruses [23]), a diagnosis may be delayed if not
immediately considered.
The public health benefit resulting from early detection
of an epidemic is likely to vary by disease. If a disease has
a relatively wide distribution of potential onsets, early
recognition provides greater opportunity to administer pro-
phylaxis to exposed persons. For example, based on data
from the Sverdlovsk incident (24), Brookmeyer and
Blades estimated that use of antibiotic prophylaxis during
the 2001 anthrax outbreak prevented nine cases of inhala-
tional disease among exposed persons (25). If the incuba-
tion period of a disease has a relatively narrow distribu-
tion, early recognition may offer little opportunity for post-
exposure prophylaxis, although a potential benefit would
remain for alerting healthcare providers and informing
their care of others with similar symptoms. This pattern of
illness is apt to result from exposure to an F. tularensis
aerosol, which would likely result in an explosive epidem-
ic with an abrupt onset and limited duration (22). 
Detecting Specific Bioterrorism 
Epidemics and Agents 
The attributes of the CDC category A bioterrorism
agents that affect their detection, as well as the benefits of
early detection, are summarized below, on the basis of
potential bioterrorism-related epidemic profiles devel-
oped by experts (12,22,23,26–28). These profiles reflect
current knowledge of these diseases; their epidemiology
might differ if novel modes of dissemination or prepara-
tion were employed. Each disease has attributes that could
increase or decrease the likelihood of early outbreak
recognition through either clinical diagnosis or syndromic
surveillance.
Inhalational Anthrax
The distribution of the incubation period for inhalation-
al anthrax can be relatively broad as observed in
Sverdlovsk (2–43 days); most cases occur within 1–2
weeks after exposure (24). In the 2001 U.S. outbreak, the
distribution of incubation periods was more limited, 4–6
days, although later-onset cases may have been averted by
antibiotic prophylaxis (25). The nonspecific prodrome for
anthrax may last from several hours to several days. Taken
together, these data suggest that the initial slope of an epi-
demic curve may be comparatively gradual during the first
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Table 2. Characteristics of bioterrorism-related epidemics that affect detection through clinical recognition versus syndromic 
surveillance 
Characteristics
a  Clinical recognition
b  Syndromic surveillance
c 
Duration and variability of 
incubation period 
Broader distribution of incubation period 
increases likelihood that patient with short 
incubation-period disease would be diagnosed 
before a statistical threshold of syndromic cases 
is exceeded. 
More narrow distribution of incubation period—leading 
to a steeper epidemic curve in the initial phase—increases 
likelihood that statistical threshold would be exceeded 
sooner. 
Duration of nonspecific 
prodromal phase  
Shorter prodrome increases likelihood of 
recognition or diagnosis at more severe or 
fulminant stage. 
Longer prodrome increases likelihood that increase in 
syndromic manifestations would be detectable and that 
recognition of more severe stage (at which a diagnosis is 
more apt to be made) would be delayed. 
Presence or absence of clinical 
sign that would heighten 
suspicion of diagnosis  
Presence increases likelihood of earlier clinical 
recognition and diagnosis (e.g., mediastinal 
widening on chest x-ray in inhalational anthrax). 
Absence decreases likelihood that diagnosis would be 
considered clinically, increasing opportunity for earlier 
detection by means of syndromic surveillance. 
Likelihood of making diagnosis 
in the course of routine 
evaluation  
If diagnosis is apt to be made in the course of a 
routine diagnostic evaluation (not dependent on 
clinical suspicion of specific bioterrorism 
infection), early diagnosis through clinical care is 
likely.  
If diagnosis is dependent on the use of a special test that 
is unlikely to be ordered in the absence of clinical 
suspicion of diagnosis, then diagnosis in clinical care may 
be delayed, increasing the opportunity for early detection 
through syndromic surveillance.  
aInfection or disease attributes that may affect detection of an epidemic. 
bIncreases likelihood of initial detection through routine clinical care and reporting. 
cIncreases likelihood of initial detection through syndromic surveillance. week, leading to slower recognition through syndromic
surveillance than for other infections caused by bioterror-
ist agents with pulmonary manifestations, such as
tularemia or pneumonic plague (22,28). In contrast, medi-
astinal widening on chest x-ray or computed tomographic
scan or Gram stain of cerebrospinal or pleural fluid should
lead an alert and knowledgeable physician to consider the
diagnosis of anthrax, even though these tests may not be
conducted until relatively late in the clinical course. B.
anthracis is likely to be detected quickly in cultures, favor-
ing clinical recognition. Retrospective analysis of data
from 2001 showed that inhalational anthrax can be distin-
guished from influenzalike illness or community-acquired
pneumonia by using an algorithm that combines clinical
and laboratory findings (20), although the practical utility
of this approach is untested. In addition to permitting
antibiotic use among ill persons, early recognition would
enable postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis (12,25).
Tularemia 
The typical incubation period for tularemia is relatively
narrow after a person is exposed to aerosolized F. tularen-
sis, with abrupt onset of nonspecific febrile illness, with or
without respiratory symptoms, in 3–5 days (range 1–14
days), followed by rapid progression to life-threatening
pneumonitis (22). This relatively narrow incubation period
for most patients and rapid progression to severe disease
would lead to a rapid increase in cases after a large and
acute exposure. Finding a number of such cases in a short
interval should trigger both syndromic surveillance alarms
and clinical suspicion. F. tularensis is a slow-growing and
fastidious organism and may take up to 5 days after inoc-
ulation to be detectable, if it is detected at all, in a routine-
ly processed blood culture. The use of special laboratory
techniques may be required, delaying the likelihood of
detection in the absence of clinical suspicion. After an epi-
demic is recognized, specific antibiotic therapy is recom-
mended for exposed persons in whom a febrile illness
develops (22).
Pneumonic Plague 
Exposure to aerosolized Yersinia pestis results in pneu-
monic plague, which has a typical incubation period of 2
to 4 days (range 1–6 days). The disease has a relatively
short prodrome, followed by rapidly progressive pneumo-
nia (28), which would lead to a rapid increase in cases at
the onset of an epidemic. Standard clinical laboratory find-
ings are nonspecific, which alone might not prompt clini-
cal suspicion, but microscopic examination of a sputum
smear may show characteristic findings, which should
prompt consideration of the diagnosis. Cultures of blood or
sputum are apt to show growth within 24 to 48 hours, but
routine procedures may misidentify Y. pestis unless the
diagnosis is suspected and special attention is given to
specimen processing. Confirming the diagnosis depends
on special tests available through reference laboratories.
Treatment the first day of symptoms is generally consid-
ered necessary to prevent death in pneumonic plague, so
early recognition of an aerosol plague attack would enable
life-saving use of antibiotics in febrile patients and prophy-
laxis of contacts (28).
Botulism 
Foodborne botulism typically has a relatively narrow
incubation period (12–72 hours), which may vary from 2
hours to 8 days, depending on the inoculum. For the three
known cases of inhalational botulism attributed to a rela-
tively low exposure to aerosolized toxin, the incubation
period was approximately 72 hours (26). The characteris-
tic clinical picture of descending paralysis should prompt
consideration of botulism, and this unique pattern among
bioterrorism agents lends itself to a specific syndrome cat-
egory. However, the illness may be misdiagnosed, as
observed in a large foodborne outbreak of botulism in
1985; 28 persons who had eaten at a particular restaurant
and in whom botulism had developed were assigned other
diagnoses before the geographically dispersed outbreak
was recognized and publicized in the media (26,29).
Symptoms of inhalational botulism, with choking, dyspha-
gia, and dysarthria dominating the clinical picture, may
differ from those associated with ingestion of toxin and
complicate recognition of the disease. Specialized testing
for botulinum toxin is available at a limited number of
state laboratories and CDC. Postexposure prophylaxis is
limited by the scarcity of, and potential for, allergic reac-
tions to botulinum antitoxin, leading to recommendations
that exposed persons be observed carefully for early signs
of botulism, which should prompt antitoxin use (26).
Antitoxin should be given as early as possible, another fact
that highlights the importance of early detection.
Depending on the level of exposure and the geographic
dispersion of affected persons, syndromic surveillance for
characteristic neurologic symptoms could aid outbreak
detection, or the occurrence of an epidemic might be obvi-
ous to clinicians. 
Smallpox 
The incubation period of smallpox is usually 12–14
days but may range from 7 to 17 days. The early sympto-
matic phase includes a severe febrile illness and appear-
ance of a nonspecific macular rash over a 2- to 4-day peri-
od, followed by evolution to a vesicular and then pustular
rash over the next 4 to 5 days (27). Thus, the initial phase
of smallpox may lend itself to detection through surveil-
lance of a febrile rash illness syndrome. Once smallpox is
suspected, the virus can be rapidly detected by electron
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laboratory resources for electron microscopy are available,
or by polymerase chain reaction, if the necessary primers
are available. Contacts can be protected by vaccination up
to 4 days after exposure. Discourse is substantial about the
relative merits of pre-event versus postevent vaccination
(27,30–33).Syndromic surveillance may show an increase
in febrile rash illness, although once the characteristic rash
appears, the diagnosis should be quickly established. 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
This category includes multiple infectious agents that
range from having a relatively broad to narrow incubation
period (e.g., Ebola, 2–21 days; yellow fever 3–6 days).
These diseases present with nonspecific prodromes that
may have an insidious or abrupt onset. In severe cases, the
prodrome is followed by hypotension, shock, central nerv-
ous system dysfunction, and a bleeding diathesis. The dif-
ferential diagnosis includes a variety of viral and bacterial
diseases. Establishing the diagnosis depends on clinical
suspicion and the results of specific tests that must be
requested from CDC or the U. S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases. The value of postexposure
prophylaxis with antiviral medications is uncertain, and
(with the exception of yellow fever, for which a vaccine is
available) response measures are limited to isolation and
observation of exposed persons, treatment with ribavarin
(if the virus is one that responds to that antiviral drug), and
careful attention to infection control measures (23).
Patients seen with symptoms during the prodromal phase
may not clearly fit into a single syndrome category, but
syndromic surveillance focused on the early signs of a
febrile bleeding disorder would be more specific.  
One of the biggest concerns about syndromic surveil-
lance is its potentially low specificity, resulting in use of
resources to investigate false alarms (6,10). Specificity for
distinguishing bioterrorism-related epidemics from more
ordinary illness may be low because the early symptoms of
bioterrorism-related illness overlap with those of many
common infections. Specificity for distinguishing any type
of outbreak from random variations in illness trends may
be low if statistical detection thresholds are reduced to
enhance sensitivity and timeliness. The likelihood that a
given alarm represents a bioterrorism event will be low,
assuming that probability of such an event is low in a given
locality. Approaches used to increase specificity include
requiring that aberrant trends be sustained for at least 2
days or that aberrant trends be detected in multiple systems
(2). Another approach to enhancing specificity would be to
focus surveillance on the severe phases of disease, since
the category Abioterrorism infections are more likely than
many common infections to progress to life-threatening
illness. For those diseases that are likely to progress rapid-
ly, such as pneumonic plague, syndromic detection of
severe disease (e.g., through emergency room visits, hos-
pital admissions, or deaths) may be more feasible than
detection aimed at early indicators before care is sought
(e.g., purchases of over-the-counter medications) or when
illness is less severe (e.g., primary care visits). Whether
detection of syndromic late-stage disease offers an advan-
tage over detection through clinical evaluation will depend
on the attributes of the infections and diagnostic resources,
as described above. 
Predicting how the mix of relevant factors would com-
bine in a given situation to affect the recognition of a
bioterrorism-related epidemic is difficult, although mathe-
matical models may provide further insight (5). The most
important factors affecting early detection are likely to be
the rate of accrual of new cases at the outset of an epidem-
ic, geographic clustering, the selection of syndromic sur-
veillance methods, and the likelihood of making a diagno-
sis quickly in clinical practice. 
Ongoing efforts to strengthen the public health infra-
structure (34,35) and to educate healthcare providers about
bioterrorism diseases and reporting procedures should
strengthen the ability to recognize bioterrorism outbreaks.
For example, in New Jersey in 2001, reporting of two early
cases of cutaneous anthrax was delayed until publicity
about other anthrax cases prompted physicians to consider
the diagnosis and notify the health department, suggesting
that opportunities for earlier use of postexposure prophy-
laxis were missed (36). In addition, while the importance
of new diagnostic tools, including rapid tests, should be
emphasized (37), the essential role of existing diagnostic
techniques should not be overlooked. Clinical suspicion is
critical, and a key prompt for arousing clinical suspicion
may be the microscopic examination of a routinely collect-
ed specimen, as occurred in the index case of the 2001
anthrax outbreak, when a Gram stain of the cerebrospinal
fluid led to the diagnosis (15). However, as recently high-
lighted by the Institute of Medicine, the use of basic diag-
nostic tests has decreased because of efforts to reduce the
costs of care, the increasing use of empiric broad-spectrum
antibiotic therapy, and federal laboratory regulations, such
as the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988, which have discouraged laboratory evaluation in
some clinical settings (38). 
While we have focused on the role of syndromic sur-
veillance in detecting a bioterrorism-related epidemic,
other uses of syndromic surveillance include detecting nat-
urally occurring epidemics, providing reassurance that epi-
demics are not occurring when threats or rumors arise, and
tracking bioterrorism-related epidemics regardless of the
mode of detection (4,6,10). Syndromic surveillance is
intended to enhance, rather than replace, traditional
approaches to epidemic detection. Evaluation of syn-
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uses is essential. A certain level of false alarms, as the
result of either syndromic surveillance or calls from clini-
cians, will be necessary to ensure that opportunities for
detection are not missed. Efforts to enhance the predictive
value of syndromic surveillance will be offset by costs in
timeliness and sensitivity, and defining the right balance in
practice, particularly in the absence of an accurate assess-
ment of bioterrorism risk, will be essential. 
Two committees of the National Academies have rec-
ommended more careful evaluation of the usefulness of
syndromic surveillance before it is more widely imple-
mented (5,38). Because the epidemiologic characteristics
of different bioterrorism agents may vary in ways that
affect the detection of epidemics, these evaluations should
address the epidemiology of specific bioterrorism agents.
Efforts to detect bioterrorism epidemics at an early stage
should not only address the development of innovative new
surveillance mechanisms but also strengthen resources for
diagnosis and enhance relationships between clinicians and
public health agencies—relationships that will ensure that
clinicians notify public health authorities if they suspect or
diagnose a possible bioterrorism-related disease. 
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